

















Uncertainty about the precise quantitative effect of policy is endemic in economics. In a classic 
paper, Brainard showed that in the face of model of multiplier uncertainty optimal policy is 
relatively conservative. I extend this work to a dynamic model and show in general that gradual 
adjustment is optimal and in the most simple case derive the classic partial adjustment model as 
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The idea for this paper was suggested to me by Arabinda Basistha, who also made many suggestions 
while it was being constructed. Thoughtful comments from Stanley Fischer, Shelly Lundberg, Chang-
Jin Kim, and Jeremy Piger are greatly appreciated. It is a commonplace that in the face of uncertainty, policy should be applied cautiously. 
“Cautiously” is at times interpreted as meaning that policy should be applied gradually. By 
extending Brainard’s classic analysis to a dynamic setting we see in this paper that this is 
sometimes precisely the right advice. 
Over 35 years ago William Brainard (Brainard, 1967) showed that when a policy 
multiplier is uncertain, one ought to aim to reach only part of the way toward the desired target, 
and that the optimal policy itself is applied more modestly than would be true under certainty 
equivalence. Operating in a static model Brainard cautioned “The gap [between optimal and 
certainty equivalence] in this context is not the difference between what policy was ‘last period’ 
and what would be required to make the expected value of [the target variable equal to the 
target.” (p. 415) Cautionary advice notwithstanding, Brainard’s work is frequently offered as an 
informal justification for gradual adjustment. In a dynamic model this can be justified 
rigorously.
1 I show here not only that multiplier uncertainty under dynamics induces a gradual 
response, but that under a particular, reasonable specification, the optimal policy is to follow the 
classic partial adjustment model. 
Partial adjustment models have proven extraordinarily useful in empirical work and 
uncertainty as to the precise quantitative effect of manipulating a policy variable is endemic. 
While there is nothing in either Brainard’s analysis or the present one which limits its 
applicability to a specific branch of economics, both Brainard’s and recent work have been 
motivated by monetary policy concerns. Fischer and Cooper (1973) show that in a dynamic 
                                                 
1 A point presaged perhaps by Kane’s commentary on the original presentation at the 1966 annual 
meetings, “As useful as this prospective should prove to be…it will be necessary to extend the Brainard 
model to dynamic situations.” (Kane 1967, p 432.) 
-1- model with multiplier uncertainty, certainty equivalence policy is not optimal and that increased 
multiplier uncertainty argues for more cautious policy. (See also Cooper and Fischer, 1974.) 
A number of recent papers have emphasized the theoretical and practical importance of 
gradual response in the context of interest rate smoothing by the Federal Reserve when 
implementing a modified Taylor rule, although these models do not develop the classic partial 
adjustment model. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) emphasizes the empirical importance of 
including a lagged interest rate in a monetary policy rule. Sack (2000) gives analytic results in a 
VAR context and uses numerical methods to provide empirical evidence that multiplier 
uncertainty matters considerably. Wieland (2000, 2002) looks at parameter uncertainty that he 
then endogenizes, that is to say he then looks at the issue of learning and experimentation. See 
also Sack and Wieland (2000) and Svensson (1999). 
I.  The Static Brainard Model 
I begin with a static Brainard model, both as a reminder of the classic result and to set out 
the basic mathematical structure of the model. In a static world one can write 
  yx u β = +  (1.1) 
where   is the outcome,  y x is the policy instrument, β  is the policy multiplier distributed 
(
2 , ) β β σ , and u is a shock distributed ( )
2 , u u σ , where both distributions are conditional on 
available information. 
The objective function to be minimized is 
  ( )
2 * 1
2 LE yy   =−    
 (1.2) 
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β β βσ  =+  . Second, it is convenient to assume that β  and   are uncorrelated, in 
which case 
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Equation (1.4) presents Brainard’s classic result: optimal policy is a multiple λ , 
01 λ ≤≤ , of the certainty equivalence policy ( )
* yuβ − . When there is no multiplier 
uncertainty  , the certainty equivalence policy is optimal. The greater the 
uncertainty about the multiplier, scaled by its mean, the more “cautious” policy should be in the 
sense that the optimal policy moves toward zero. 
2 0 β σλ →⇒→ 1
Multiplier uncertainty arises for several reasons. Parameters are subject to estimation 
uncertainty, parameters evolve over time, and probably of greatest importance the “true” model 
is itself uncertain. To see that multiplier uncertainty can be an important practical issue, consider 
estimation uncertainty alone. Note that the ratio  β β σ  is “the t-statistic” from an econometric 
-3- estimate. So that were estimation uncertainty the only issue, a t- of 2.0 would imply  0.8 λ =  in 
equation (1.4). 
In the static world described by equation (1.1) “cautious” does not imply any sort of 
gradual adjustment.
2 There is no temporal linkage between periods. If the effect of policy is very 
uncertain, then it is optimal to use very little policy in the sense that optimal x is close to zero. 
However, there is no sense in which one takes small steps. Equation (1.4) calls for a policy 
response which may be small, but which is complete in the current period. In the next section I 
turn to a model in which there are temporal linkages and where optimal policy does result in 
gradual adjustment.  
 
II  Dynamic Model Under Multiplier Uncertainty 
In order for there to be persistence in policy response there needs to be persistence in the 
effect of policy. I make the model dynamic by allowing the change in   to be moved by both 
shocks and policy. In addition, I allow the policy multiplier to vary by period. The structural 
model is now 
y
  1 tt t t yy x u t β − = ++  (2.1) 
where I assume that   is in the information set. The shock is composed of an anticipated part 
and a surprise, 
1 t y −
tt+   t uu = t u , where I use the prescript notation t u τ  to indicate the expectation of 
 formed at time  t u τ . The variances of the two parts are 
2
u σ  and 
2
u σ  respectively, and the 
anticipated shock and surprise are of course uncorrelated. 
























One wants to distinguish persistence due to multiplier uncertainty from the direct effect 
of the persistence in   due to building lagged   into the unit root specification in equation (2.1)
. Initially, consider the case where 
y y
t β  is certain but   is random. Optimal policy is  t u
()
*
1 tt xy y u t t t β − =−− , which plugging back into equation (2.1) gives realized  .  t y
 
*
tt yyuu t t = +−  (2.3) 
Lagging realized   one period and inserting back in the expression for  t y t x  gives us the 
optimal policy under multiplier certainty 
  ( ( 11 1
1 c




−− − ) )
−
=+ −  (2.4) 
Under multiplier certainty optimal policy responds fully to the expected part of the 
contemporaneous shock plus the unexpected part of the previous period’s shock. The latter term 
in the optimal policy occurs because knowledge of  1 t y −  allows for correction of the previous 
period’s error. 
Note that  tt tu −=  t
                                                                                                                                                            
uu  is an expectational error, and therefore serially uncorrelated, and 
more generally uncorrelated with any information available at the time the expectation was 
 
2 As Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999, page 1689) point out in reference to optimal interest rate rules, 
“…parameter uncertainty…may explain why … coefficients… are small relative to the case of certainty 
-5- formed. Despite the unit root process in the structural equation, realized  , as given in equation 
(2.3) shows no persistence. Similarly, so long as 
t y
t  is serially uncorrelated optimal policy under 
multiplier certainty will be uncorrelated as well. So it should be clear that the unit root in the 
structural equation is not a propagation source of persistence. 
t u
Now introduce multiplier uncertainty into the dynamic model. Suppose that  tt β βε =+ 
where  (
2 ~0 , t ) β ε σ . I assume that the distribution of ε  is ergodic and will assume shortly that the 
ε  are i.i.d. I also make explicit the assumption that  1 yτ −  is in the information set iff  1 t τ >− and 
assume that u  and ε  are independent at all leads and lags. 
In period T  the problem is 




TT T T x yx u y β − ++ −  (2.5) 

















It is useful to define the expected deviation of   from target in the absence of policy as  y
*
1 ttt t yy uy − ≡+ −   . One can then write the realized deviation of   from target as  y
*
tt t t t yy y xu u β −=+ + −   t t
                                                                                                                                                            
. 
Given the policy in equation (2.6) the deviation of realized   from target is  T y
 
equivalence. But it does not explain…partial adjustment.” 
-6-   (
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− +   , where the 
expectation operator  [ ] E  refers to the expectation taken at time T 1 − . Substituting in the time 
 deviation from equation (2.7) and then substituting in the structural equation for   the 
optimization problem can be written 
T 1 T y −
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A general solution to (2.9) involves high-order cross moments of ε . From this point 
onward I impose the assumption that the ε  are i.i.d.
3 In order to simplify equation (2.9) a few 
reminders about statistical algebra are helpful. First, by the law of iterated expectations 
                                                 
3 The generic point about gradual adjustment doesn’t depend on the assumption of i.i.d. errors, but the 
specific solution certainly does. For example, suppose that  T β  and  1 T β −  are perfectly correlated. The 
term multiplying  1 T x −  involves the second, third, and fourth central moments of β . The next term 
involves the first, second, and third central moments. The solution is untidy. 
-7- [ ] 11 E TT T TTTT uu u u −− −= − = 0 , eliminating the third term. Second, the expectation of the square 
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 
=− +   +  
=− + −
=−
σ  (2.10) 
A third useful rule is that expectation of the product of independent random variables is the 
product of the expectations. For example, 
22
22
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because  T ε  and  1 T ε −  are independent. Using these three rules equation (2.9) simplifies to 
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 ++ − ⋅ − 
 +− 
+  (2.11) 
Solving for optimal policy in period T 1 −  gives 


















λ ρ − +
 (2.12) 
According to equation (2.12) under uncertainty policy in period T 1 −  adjusts partially to 
shocks in period T . Specifically, the first term is  1 − λ  times the certainty equivalence policy. In 
addition, policy partially anticipates shocks in period   as seen in the response to  T 1 TT u − . But 
-8- note that under certainty,  1 λ = , policy does not anticipate future shocks. This is because the 





() 1 t+  
tt yx ∂∂
The results for periods T  and T 1 −  are generalized in the following lemma: 
Lemma: If the shocks   are i.i.d.










t  (2.13) 
Proof:  Set this up as a stochastic dynamic programming problem. Define the optimal 
program 
  () () ( ) ( )
2 1
1 2 min E * E
t
tt t t x y y Vy ρ + =− +    (2.14)  t  
As a prescient guess, suppose the value function can be written
5 










= −⋅+ ⋅+ ⋅ −⋅   −− − −  
    (2.15) 
2 1 u
In evaluating Vy  make use of the substitution  11 tt t t t t t t yyx u uu 1 t β + ++ = ++ − +    . 
Noting that both  β = and  1 tt yxt β + ∂ ∂=   , the first order condition for the 
dynamic program is  
t








=+ + − + ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅   −− 
    (2.16) 
                                                 
4 Note that the second term in equation (2.12) drops out because  1 0 u − TT = . 
5 To verify that this is the proper value function, solve the optimization, insert equation (2.15) into 
equation (2.14) and show that the latter is indeed a valid equation. (Or see the appendix available from 
the author.) 
-9- Substituting for   one can re-write the first order condition as  1 t y +  
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t  (2.18) 
proving the lemma. 
Deviations from target under optimal policy are  
  (





−= − +− 

  ) t  (2.19) 
and realized   obeys the process  y
  ()
*






=+ − + − + 

 (2.20) 
III  Impulse Response Functions and Partial Adjustment 





tt t t xy yu β − =−− . Similarly, absent multiplier uncertainty one can use  () t λββ −= 10  
in equation (2.20) to find the realized value 
*
tt yyuu t t = +− . Together these can be used to 
show that optimal policy responds fully to the expected part of the contemporaneous shock plus 
-10- the unexpected part of the previous period’s shock,  ( ) ( ) 111
c
tt t t t t xu u u β −−− =− − + , confirming 
the result derived directly in equation (2.4). 
What is the impulse response function of 
c x  with respect to an anticipated negative unit 
shock? Contemporaneously 
c x  rises by 1 β . The following period, both   and  1 t u − 1 tt u −− 1  have 
changed by one unit, so the effects offset. Thus the impulse response function of policy to an 
anticipated shock is a 1 β  high spike followed by a zero flat as shown in Figure 1. 
What is the impulse response function of  t x  with respect to an anticipated negative unit 
shock when there is multiplier uncertainty? Contemporaneously  t x  rises by λ β , from equation 
(2.18). We can read the remainder of the impulse response from equations (2.18) and (2.20); the 


















  (3.1) 
The impulse response function in equation (3.1) is random, but we can usefully evaluate 
the path taking expectations with respect to β . The expected impulse response function to an 
anticipated shock, shown in Figure 1, is λ β , ( ) ( ) 1 λ βλ ⋅ − , ( ) (
2
1 ) λ βλ ⋅− , etc. The effect of 
policy on   cumulates over time. In the short run, the effect of policy is to offset in expected 
value a fraction 
y
λ  of an anticipated shock. As the sum of the expected impulse response 
function is 1 β , in the long run an anticipated shock is fully offset. 
-11- So in the static Brainard model, adjustment is contemporaneous but conservative. In the 
dynamic model presented here, adjustment persists over time and in the long run there is full 
adjustment to the certainty equivalence level. 



















Policy uncertainty λ =0.4
 
Figure 1 












Turn now directly to the question of the classic partial adjustment model. Use repeated 
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-12- Suppose that at some point in the distant past the system was in equilibrium; label this 
period   so that  and the first term in equation (3.2) drops out. Insert a lagged version 
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Since β  is random 
*
t x  is random. Taking the expectation over β  as above the expected 
path of 
*
t x  is 
  () () ()
() ()
2
max 0, 1 *













−− −− −− −− −−
=

=− + − + − −   
 ∑  (3.4) 
where li . Lag  ()
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t x  once and multiply by 1 λ − . 
() () () () () ()
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Derivation of a partial adjustment model is now straightforward. Quasi-differencing gives 
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 (3.6) 
or 




tt t t 1 x xx x λ − −= − −  (3.7) 
which is the classic partial adjustment model (Nerlove 1958). 
 
-13- IV Extensions 
In this section I consider two extensions to the dynamic specification. 
A.  Serially correlated shocks without structural persistence 
Suppose that the economy lacks structural persistence,  tt yx t u β = +
1 tt uu
, but that the shocks 
are serially correlated. If u  is first order serially correlated, as in  t t e φ − = + , then 





























Noting that the term in square brackets in (4.1) is the surprise in the change in expectations 
between time t  and time   and therefore uncorrelated with information at time  , the 
correlation between policies in the two periods is 
1 − t 1 t −
( ) 1 , tt x x corr φ − = . The correlation is 
independent of λ . So while shocks are serially correlated and policy is both serially correlated 
and cautious, the serial correlation in policy has nothing to do with uncertainty and there is no 
gradual adjustment of policy. 
B. Stationary  dynamics 
The static and dynamic models studied in the previous sections nest inside 
  1 ttt t yy x t u θ β − = ++  (4.2) 
-14- with  1 θ =  or  0 θ = . Even when there is a unit root in the structural equation,  1 θ =
t y
,   is made 
stationary by the optimal policy. It is interesting to consider the case in which   is stationary 
because 
t y
1 θ < . 
For general parameter values for λ  and θ  the optimal policy includes a nonergodic term 
in  . (See appendix available from the author.) Nonetheless, the expected value impulse 
response to an anticipated (negative) shock follows 
* y
λ β ,  ( ) 1 λ βθ λ  ⋅−      , 
()
2
1 λ βθ λ  ⋅−      , and so on. Except when dynamics are absent ( ) 0 θ =  or when uncertainty is 
absent  , the result of geometric decay of policy response to a shock is general, with the 
decay rate 
() 1 λ =
( 1 ) θ λ −  being more rapid when the persistence in   is less.  y





β θλ − −
1
. The long-run 
response equals the certainty equivalent response only if θ = . 
IV Conclusion 
In a static framework multiplier uncertainty gives cause to reduce the magnitude of 
policy below the certainty equivalence level. In a dynamic framework multiplier uncertainty 
gives rise to gradual adjustment. With the stochastic specification used here, the classic partial 
adjustment model is optimal and in the long run there is full adjustment to the certainty 
equivalence level.  
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-17- Appendix – Not For Publication 
Appendix A 
Suppose that rather than necessarily containing a unit root process, the specification for 
 is autoregressive as in  t y
  1 ,0 1 ttt t t yy x u θ β − θ = ++≤ ≤  (A.1) 
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The problem in period T  becomes  1 −
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 (A.3) 
Taking first partials w.r.t.  1 T x −  we have 
 
() () () ()
() ()
*
21 1 1 1
*
21 1 1 1
11
E
T T T T TT T T TT T T
TT T T T
yx u u y u u
yx u y
λλ
ρθ θ β β θ β β
ββ
θβ β
−− − − −
−− − − −
    
++ + − − + − −     
    
  ++ + −    
 
 
    (A.4) 






































ρθ β β β
β
λ






















+− +   
    
 
+− −  
 
     +− +   
   









   −+  
  
 (A.5) 
By the law of iterated expectations  [ ] 11 TT T TTTT uu u u −− E0 − =−= . Further 
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λ − . We can re-write (A.5) as 
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 (A.7) 
Note that equation (A.7) nests the two special cases given in the text:  1 θ =  and  0 θ = . 
Unlike the solution given in (2.13) the formula for the optimal policy is not generally ergodic 
because of the term multiplying  . (Although the policy rule is ergodic if any of 
* y 0 θ = ,  1 θ = , 
or  1 λ =  are true. Nonetheless, the expected value impulse response to an anticipated shock 
follows  λ β − ,  () 1 λ βθ  −⋅  λ −   ,  ()
2
1 λ βθ λ  −⋅ −      , and so on. Thus the result of 
geometric decay is general, except when dynamics are absent ( ) 0 θ =  or when uncertainty is 
absent  .  () 1 λ =
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 (A.8) 
Using (A.2) we have  
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The problem in period T  becomes  2 −
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which has the first-order condition 
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Taking expectation of the third term gives 
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Putting the first order condition back together gives 
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Collecting terms gives us 
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 (A.18) 
Optimal policy is given by  
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 (A.19) 
It appears that the general solution for optimal policy is 
()
() ()
()() () () ( )
2
*
1 2 22 2
11 0
11 0
TT T T xy u y
τ
ττ τ τ τ
λθ ρ ρ ρ λλ
θ
ββ λρ θ ρ θ ρ θ
−− − − −

+− ++ ++  =− + + 





Note that if any of  1 θ = ,  0 θ = , or  1 λ =  are true, then the last factor in equation (A.20) equals 
one and the formula reduces to that given earlier in the paper. 
-24- Appendix B 
Here is an alternative derivation of the first lemma in the paper. 
Lemma: If the shocks   are i.i.d.
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6 Note that the second term in equation (2.12) drops out because  1 0 u − TT = . 
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Now take the derivative of   w.r.t.  t L t x . 
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λ  (B.5) 
Setting the expression in (B.5) equal to zero and noting that variables not involving τ  
pass through the summation operator, the optimization problem solves 


















=+ − + + − − ∑∑  (B.6) 
The summation terms in equation (B.6) can be cancelled out. What’s left gives the optimal 
policy as specified in equation (B.1), completing the proof. 
 
-26- Appendix C 
The following is the proof that the proposed value function “works.” 
The value function is  
  () () () ()
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    (C.1) 
We need to show that 
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Evaluating the forward term gives 
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The penalty function is 
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Substituting into the original equation gives 
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multiply through by 21 ( ( 1 ρ λ −− and collect terms giving 
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-28- Now collect terms as in  
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
  (C.8) 
Each of the three leading coefficients equals zero, proving the equation is valid. 
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